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ACHIEVING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD IN
SPACE-RELATED PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS:
CAN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UPSET THE BALANCE?
DIANE HowARD*

"wolde you bothe eate your cake, and have your cake?"
John Heywood, 1546
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INTRODUCTION

NCREASINGLY IMPORTANT to the space industry are the
Ihybrid entities known as public-private partnerships ("P3s"),
that result along the spectrum between the public and private
sectors. They are neither new nor peculiar to space ventures.
P3s can be found in a wide range of applications, including public utilities, infrastructure projects in developing countries, and
social service delivery through the faith-based initiative in the
United States.
Accountability in business is always a key concern, and space
business certainly is no exception. If a government partner can
avoid responsibility for its actions in space industry by invoking
state immunity, the risks borne by the private side partner could
* Diane Howard is a practicing member of the Florida Bar, currently
completing the requirements for her L.L.M. at McGill University, Institute of Air
and Space Law.
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be disproportionate to the possible upside potential. Such imbalance can create an uneven playing field and perhaps cripple
commercial growth.
Following this Introduction, Section II of the paper will define public-private partnerships and identify some of the contexts in which they have operated, naming some emerging P3s
in the space industry and articulating scenarios along the publicprivate continuum that could implicate government immunity.
Section III will begin with a discussion of the evolution of sovereign immunity and trace the development of state immunity
jurisprudence in the United States, and will address immunity
for foreign states, the federal government, and the states. This
section also will outline the various tests to determine when and
how immunity is to be applied in U.S. courts. Although primarily concerned with the U.S. experience, the paper also will outline a general discussion of immunities in the European Union
and Canada.
Section IV will apply the tests to P3s and determine whether
and when immunity might inure to the government partner in a
space venture. Finally, the conclusion addresses some of the
identified problems that have arisen in other P3 contexts and
makes recommendations to the space industry to avoid those
impediments to good business.
II.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS DEFINED

Methods of financing public services have undergone significant transformation since World War II. "[T]he international
trend was to nationalize energy and other infrastructure assets
and institute strong controls over private monopolies in order to
limit abuses of market power."' Over time, the costs of public
ownership, subsidization, and the erosion of operational efficiency became apparent, resulting in a restructuring trend. 2 Internationally, governments felt pressure to change the standard
models of procurement, largely because of concerns for high
levels of public debt.'
In the United States, the Reagan Administration, faced with
the growing cost of New Deal social programs, began to reduce
I Robert Taylor, Independent Regulation and Infrastructure Reform 2 (2006),
http://www.ip3.org/pdf/2006_publication_012.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Wikipedia, Public-private partnerships, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publicprivate-partnership (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
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federal spending on social service delivery hoping that the nonprofit sector-in partnership with the private sector-would
strengthen.' A study of the effects of this reduction in federal
support revealed that it was the private sector alone that moved
in to compensate for the deficit, creating concerns about commercialism.5 Some of these concerns arose because
private institutions often pose a greater risk of harming others
because of reduced governmental oversight. This possibility surfaces when considering the privatization of any public service;
the private entity may produce more efficient or cost-effective results by avoiding responsibilities required of public entities. Even
private entities are subject to public laws, then, when the public
interest being protected is strong enough. As a result hybrid entities arise, performing public services but bound to adhere to
certain regulations. 6
Whereas privatization is on a 'jolting downdraft,"7 public-private partnerships are now hailed as "the new paradigm for economic development in the 21st century. . . increasingly being
used as a policy tool to transform the role of national and local
governments in public service delivery, infrastructure development, poverty alleviation, capital market improvement, and governance around the world."8 This trend is global,9 particularly
in the European and Asian markets.1 0 In an interview given in
1999 when he was Deputy Director of the Congressional Budget
Office, Barry Anderson, now head of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, expressed his belief that
public-private partnerships were a possible mechanism to
4James C. Mussewhhite, Jr., The Impacts of New Federalism on Public/PrivatePartnerships 16 PUBLIUS:J. FEDERALISM 113, 115 (1986).
5 Id. at 129-30.
6 St. Johnsbury Acad. v. D.H., 20 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683-84 (D. Vt. 1998).
7 Jerome Donovan, Don't Want to Privatize? Then Corporatize (But Do it
Right) (May 2006), www.IP3.org http://www.ip3.org/pub/2006-publication006.pdf. Although the concepts of privatization and P3s often have been used
interchangeably in the United States, this paper will treat the two as separate,
discrete entities found at different points along the public-private continuum,
with privatization referring to the furthest point on the private side, and the P3s
falling somewhere along the spectrum, depending on the characteristics of each
particular project.
s IP3, President's Welcome (Jan. 2008), http://www.ip3.org/a-president.htm.
9 SeeJumokeJagun & Isabel Marques de Sa, The Role and Importance of Independent Advisors in PPP Transactions (Aug. 2006), http://www.ip3.org/pdf/
2006_publication_014.pdf.
1o SeeJacques Cook, U.S. PPP Market on the Upswing: Some Thoughts from
Abroad 1-2 (Apr. 2007), http://www.ip3.org/pdf/2007-publication-002.pdf.
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achieve budget reform in the face of constraints on top-down
budgeting mechanisms in the United States. 1
P3s "generally [are] recognized [to exist] wherever there is a
contractual relationship between the public sector and a private
sector company designed to deliver a project or service that traditionally is carried out by the public sector."' 2 In Canada, the
term has a very specific meaning: "First, it relates to the provision of public services or public infrastructure. Second, it necessitates the transfer of risk between partners. Arrangements that
do not include these two concepts are not technically 'publicprivate partnerships."' 1 3 Allocation of risk is a necessary factor.
The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships describes various business structures that fall within the parameters
of P3s, as follows:
Design-Build (DB): The private sector designs and builds infrastructure to meet public sector performance specifications, often
for a fixed price, so the risk of cost overruns is transferred to the
private sector. (Many do not consider DBs to be within the spectrum of [P3s]).
Operation & Maintenance Contract (0 & M): A private operator,
under contract, operates a publicly-owned asset for a specified
term. Ownership of the asset remains with the public entity.
Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO): The private sector designs, finances and constructs a new facility under a long-term
lease, and operates the facility during the term of the lease. The
private partner transfers the new facility to the public sector at
the end of the lease term.
Build-Own-Operate (BOO): The private sector finances, builds,
owns and operates a facility or service in perpetuity. The public
constraints are stated in the original agreement and through ongoing regulatory authority.
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT): A private entity receives a
franchise to finance, design, build and operate a facility (and to
charge user fees) for a specified period, after which ownership is
transferred back to the public sector.
Buy-Build-Operate (BBO): Transfer of a public asset to a private
or quasi-public entity usually under contract that the assets are to
I Interview with Bany Anderson, Deputy Directorof the CongressionalBudget Office, 5
GEO.PUB. POL'V Rv. 23, 28 (1999).

Cook, supra note 10, at 1.
Council for Public-Private Partnerships, http://www.pppcouncil.
ca/aboutPPPdefinition.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
12
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be upgraded and operated for a specified period of time. Public
control is exercised through the contract at the time of transfer.
Operation License: A private operator receives a license or rights
to operate a public service, usually for a specified term. This is
often used in IT projects.
Finance Only: A private entity, usually a financial services company, funds a project directly or uses various mechanisms such as
a long-term lease or bond issue."
The Scale of Public-Private Partnerships:
Risk TransW.r & Priva te Sector Involvement

t

z

L
~Z

L$

DeIg

Jf4ort

Degr'.e of Private Se tor Invon
tyrrmr

Cmv
The Canadiani

Lfor
9r P% fc-Pr

ate,
Parters po

P3s are creative arrangements. Usually, a governmental entity
contracts with a private consortium which sets up a single-purpose entity known as a special purpose vehicle ("SPV").16 The
private consortium typically is formed by a joint venture ('IV")
between a range of contractors, banks, investors, and suppliers
willing to commit equity and/or resources to the project. 7
Some underlying principles are indispensable to the success
of P3s. Value for money is crucial and "refers to the best availa14 Id.

Id.
A. Ng & Martin Loosemore, Risk Allocation in the Private Provision of Public
Infrastructure, 25 INT'LJ. PROJECT MGMT. 66, 67 (2007).
15

16

17 [d.
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ble outcome after taking account of all benefits, costs and risks
over the whole life of the procurement.""8
[R]isk is perceived from the public sector's [perspective] as any
event which jeopardizes the quality or quantity of service that
they have contracted for, and from the private sector's [perspective] as . . . any event which causes the cash flow profile of the
project to depart from the base case and jeopardize the debt servicing ability of the project or its ability to generate a dividend
stream for shareholders.' 9
Potential risks can be divided into "general risks" and "project
risks. ' 20 Project risks flow from management and events in the
project's immediate environment, such as weather, plant and
equipment, union difficulties, disputes with the JV agreements,
technical, materials and supply, organizational, and environmental problems. 2 1 General risks are not directly associated
with the project itself, but have an effect on its outcome. 22 They
tend to occur in the macro-environment and arise from natural,
23
political, regulatory, legal, and economic events.
The costs associated with payment of claims against a project
are a contemplated risk more likely to fall into the project risk
category, although there is the possibility this could occur
outside the immediate project environment. Note the difference between a standard contractual claim and one flowing
from a 9/li-type catastrophe. Risks associated with SPVs and
contractual difficulties have also been called "sponsor risk" or
"default risk."2 4 Optimally, risks are allocated to the party in the
best position to control them. Rules guiding optimal distribution of risk require that the party to whom the risk is allocated:
" has been made fully aware of the risks they are taking;
* has the greatest capacity [expertise and authority] to manage
the risk effectively and efficiently (and thus charge the lowest
risk premium);
" has the capability and resources to cope with the risk
eventuating;
18 XiAo-HuAJIN & HEMANTA DOLOI, RISK ALLOCATION IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTMODEL WITH AN INTELLIGENT APPROACH 3
(2007), available at http://www.rics.org/NR/rdonlyres/21C6D994-732D-46EF8B48-66815F21DAA7/0/Cob2007Jin.pdf.
19 Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).
20 Ng & Loosemore, supra note 16, at 69.
NERSHIP PROJECTS-AN INNOVATIVE

21

Id.

23

Id.
Id.

24

Id. at 70.

22
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* has the necessary risk appetite to want to take the risk; and
the chance to charge an appropriate premium
* has been given
25
for taking it.
Internationally, examples of P3s abound. They include, inter
alia, airports, airlines, tunnels, highways, hospitals, social programs, defense facilities, rapid transit systems, bridges, health
service delivery systems, governance infrastructure, schools and
universities, air traffic services, power providers, Central Park in
New York City, the U.S. Federal Reserve, water taxi companies,
InfraGard (the FBI and the private sector), construction
projects, ports, domestic telecommunications infrastructure,
and the information superhighway. 26 It is in these varying contexts that the existing P3 state immunity jurisprudence has
evolved.
Commercial space mirrors this trend toward hybrid entities;
examples can be found in a host of space applications encompassing remote sensing, international telecommunications,
global navigation, proposed space solar power systems, and
spaceports. Because this paper is primarily concerned with the
space industry, specific examples are given below.
In the United States, the Department of Defense partnered
with Intelsat, Ltd. and Cisco Systems, Inc. to facilitate high-speed
internet access to military units not tied to a particular location. 27 The initial cost will be borne by private investors and a
private equity fund, in hopes that "the military will make longterm commitments to support [future technologies] and new
acquisition procedures. '28 The technological application will be
added to an Intelsat satellite already under construction.2 9 The
project includes government monies for testing and evaluation,
25 Id.
2,6 See generally Cldvio Valena Filho & Jodo Bosco Lee, Brazil's New Public-Private
Partnership Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 22 J. INT'L ARB. 419 (2005);
Ronald Paul Hill, Service Provision Through Public-PrivatePartnerships:An Ethnography of Service Delivery to Homeless Teenagers, 4J. SERVICE REs. 278 (2002); Matthew
H. Hoy, The Information Superhighway: The Road to Rural Economic Development?, 6
KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 217 (1996);Jagun & Marques de Sa, supra note 9; Nicholas
P. Miller & Kenneth A. Brunetti, Using Public-Private Partnerships to Develop
Intelligent Transportation Systems: Potential Legal Barriers (2000), available at
http://wNv.millervaneaton.com/briefs-memos/using-public-private.doc;
Wikipedia, supra note 3.
27 Andy Pasztor, Pentagon, PrivateFirms Set Satellite Partnership,WALL ST. J., Apr.
9, 2007, at A9.

28

Id.

29

Id.
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but allows the military to test the new hardware for a fraction of
the cost if the project was contemplated as purely military.-"'
Other examples of satellite operations that bridge the publicprivate divide include COSMO-SkyMed, TerraSAR-X, RADARSAT-2, and Skynet. COSMO-SkyMed, jointly developed by Italy
and France, is a program of the Italian space agency and the
Italian Ministry of Defence and consists of the first of four satellites planned to form a dual-use (military and civil) earth observation system.31 On the other hand, TerraSAR-X is a German
radar satellite resulting from the partnership between the German Aerospace Center and Astrium GmbH. 2 The objectives of
this partnership are the provision of data for scientific research
and applications and the establishment of a commercial earth
observation market and sustainable business. 3
Earth observation collaboration can be found in RADARSAT2, between the Canadian Space Agency ("CSA") and MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates, Ltd.34 The CSA will recover its financial investment in the program through the supply of
RADARSAT-2 data to Canadian government agencies during the
lifetime of the mission.3 5 Skynet 5 is a military telecommunications satellite that is owned by a private company, Paradigm Secure Communications, a subsidiary of Astrium, the space arm of
the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
("EADS").

6

Additionally, commercial imaging firms Digital-

Globe and GeoEye have partnered with the U.S. Geological Survey in support of a global emergency response network. 7
Joseph Rouge, new head of the U.S. National Security Space
Office, has acknowledged the interdependence of public and
36 Id.

31 Deagel.com, COSMO-SkyMed, http://www.deagel.com/C3STAR-Satellites/COSMO-SkyMed-a000256001.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2008); Swedish
Space Corp., SSC Supports Italian Observation Satellite (June 8, 2007), http://
www. rymdbolaget.se/?id=5104&cid=8496.
'32 German Aerospace Ctr., TerraSAR-X Goes Into Operation (Jan. 9, 2008),
http://www.dlr.de/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-4219/6774_read-I 1191/.
33 See id.
34 RADARSAT-2, Mission, http://w.radarsat2.info/about/mission.asp (last
visited Sept. 7, 2008).
35 Id.
36 Andrew Chuter, ANew UK Milsat Follows Pattern of Private Ownership, DEF.
NEws, May 21, 2007, at 16.
17 Earth Observation News, Commercial Satellite Imagery Companies Partner
with the U.S. Geological Survey in Support of the International Charter "Space
and Major Disasters" (Apr. 12, 2007), http://news.eoportal.org/policy/07041 7_
poll.html.
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private sectors, both from the perspective of space situational
awareness3 8 and that of long-term relationships-including
multi-year contracts-between the U.S. government and commercial satellite and remote sensing companies. 9 Neighborhood Watch is the U.S. military program aligning government
and industry resources to address the escalating amount of
space debris and to increase space situational awareness.40
The U.S. military, heavily reliant on satellite communications,
publicly has recognized the importance of the commercial
sector in meeting its capacity shortfalls.4 ' The U.S. Defense Information Systems Agency intends to upgrade the Transformational Communications Architecture serving the Department of
Defense, the intelligence community, and NASA; the new version will expand the potential role of COMSATCOM and will
leverage emerging commercial satellite capabilities.42
Another example of the dynamic shift between commercial
and government space is NASA's $500 million U.S. Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services ("COTS") program, designed to
spur private development of commercial spacecraft that also can
service the International Space Station.4" NASA agreements
provide companies with the projected requirements, objective
criteria, information, and acknowledgement when performance
milestones are met.44 In addition, NASA plans to give away half
of its rack space on the International Space Station as an incentive for participation in the COTS program,45 and is shopping

38

SeeJOSEPH ROUGE, NAT'L SEC. SPACE OFFICE, THE STATE OF SPACE SECURITY:

3 (2008), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-spi/
Joseph% 20Rouge.pdf.
39 Caitlin Harrington, U.S. Space Office Plans Long-Thrn View for Satellite Usage,
JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Nov. 28, 2007, at 8.
40 ROUGE, supra note 38, at 8.
41 See SatNews Daily, Final Day of ISCe Stress Importance of Commercial Satellite Industry and Government Partnership (June 8, 2007), http://www.satnews.
com/stories2007/4573/.
42 Mark A. Kellner, Satellite Firms Could Sell Directly to DoD, DEF. NEWS, Jan. 15,
2007, at 6.
41 Frank Morring, Jr., Tourist Destination,AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 16,
2007, at 22, available at 2007 WLNR 8624601.
44 Press Release, NASA, NASA Signs Commercial Space Transportation Agreements (June 18, 2007), http://www.nasa.go/home/hqnews/2007/jun/HQ_
07138_COTS 3 UnfindedSAAs.html.
45 David Bond, Seeding the Station, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 22, 2007,
at 25, available at 2007 WrLNR 22357663.
SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
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for commercial and military users of the Ares launch vehicles
being developed for its Constellation program.4 6
Two leading aerospace companies, Boeing and Lockheed
Martin, plan to expand their joint venture, United Space Alliance (created to operate NASA's shuttle fleet) into "software
packages designed to support human exploration of the
Moon."4 7 The plan is to use information from NASA's 2008 Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter in conjunction with lessons learned
from past human spaceflight on the shuttle to develop applications ranging from mission design to inventory control.4 8
Spaceports probably lend themselves most easily to extrapolation of state immunity doctrine in a P3 structured project because of their similarities to airports and port authorities, for
which there is some existing precedent.4 9 Spaceport America
unveiled design renderings for its commercial spaceport center
in Sierra County, New Mexico.5 The project is the first "purpose-built" commercial spaceport,5 and is projected to stimulate as many as 5,000 new jobs and contribute as much as $1
billion to the New Mexico economy. 52 The spaceport will be
home base for Richard Branson's Virgin Galactic, 5 is facilitated
by a county Spaceport Tax,5 4 and is a good example of a publicprivate partnership. When completed, the facility will house aircraft and spacecraft, as well as Virgin Galactic's operations, in46 James R. Asker, Ride Sharing,AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 16, 2007, at
27, available at 2007 WLNR 8624646.
47 Frank Morring, Jr., Software Support, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 16,
2007, at 22, available at 2007 WLNR 8624593.
48 Id.

49 See generally Ports Auth. of P.R. v. Compafiia Panamefia de Aviacion, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 227 (D.P.R. 1999); Fla. Dept. of Rev. v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d
250 (Fla. 2005).
50 Press Release, Spaceport America, Spaceport America Design Unveiled
(Sept. 4, 2007), http://iv.spaceportamerica.com/news/press-releases/ 18spaceport-press-articles/58-design-unveiled.h tml.
51

Id.

Press Release, Spaceport America, Spaceport America Ready for Blast Off
(Apr. 5, 2007), http://www.spaceportamerica.com/news/press-releases/18spaceport-press-articles/96-spa-ready-for-blastoff.html.
53 Leonard David, Spaceport America: First Looks at a New Space Terminal,
SPACE.COM, Sept. 4, 2007, http://Nw.space.com/businesstechnology/070904_
virgingalactic-spaceport.html.
54 Press Release, Spaceport America, Sierra County Voters Approve Spaceport
Tax (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.spaceportamerica.com/news/press-releases/18spaceport-press-articles/110-sierra-county-voters-app-tax.html.
52
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cluding pre-flight and post-flight facilities, administrative offices,
and lounges.55
Space Florida is the public-private partnership legislatively
created to promote the development of Florida's aerospace industry. 56 The cooperative venture has begun with a spaceport
using already existing infrastructure, and envisions multiple
spaceports throughout the state, supporting commercial space
and personal spaceflight, as well as military and civil
applications. 57
Despite these successful examples of ventures that fall within
the spectrum of public-private cooperation, instructive is the sad
story of Europe's Galileo, a global navigation service system. The
European Commission abandoned the original plan for substantial participation by the private sector in the face of liability concerns. 58 In June 2007, transport ministers decided to go ahead
with Galileo as a publicly-funded project. 59 The failure of the

state-private partnership in the Galileo project demonstrates
why appropriate allocation of risk between public and private
partners necessitates discussion of state immunity.
It is easy to imagine scenarios in which the public partner of a
space-related P3 could attempt to evade a lawsuit. A breach of
contract flowing from the P3 agreement itself could be avoided.
Third party liability to private parties for accidents in a spaceport launch facility (such as the explosion at Scaled Composites
in 2007)6 o could be circumvented. A government partner could
sidestep liability for any simple slip-and-fall in a spaceport or facility of a space P3. Responsibility for damage from the cessation or malfunction of a signal of a global emergency response
system or navigation system could be dodged.
55

David, supra note 53.

PLAN 1-2
(2007), available at http://www.spaceflorida.gov/docs/StrategicBusiness_Plan56 Sci. APPLICATIONS INT'L CORP., SPACE FLORIDA: STRATEGIC BUSINESS

2007-2.pdf.
Id. at 13.
Elmar Giemulla & Oliver Heinrich, Hafiungsrisiken und Haftungsmanagement
im Sat-Nay Bereich (Galileo) [ The Impact of Responsibility and Liability for Galileo Services on System-Financingand Commercialization], 57 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR LuFr-UND WELTRAUMRECHT [GERMAN J. AIR & SPACE L.] 25, 39 (2008); see Taylor Dinerman,
Galileo and Her Majesty's Taxpayers, SPACE REV., July 9, 2007, http://www.thespace
review.com/article/904/ 1.
59 CMDBox, Galileo Funding Solution Remains Elusive (Sept. 18, 2007), http:/
/ww.cmdbox.com/view/Galileo_Funding-SolutionRemains
22651/.
60 Alicia Chang, 3 Dead, 3 Injured in Scaled Composites Explosion (July 27,
2007), http://www.space.com/news/ap-070727_scaled-folo.html.
57

58

734

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

It is worth noting that the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO") listed sovereign immunity as an identified liability concern for the Global Navigation Satellite System in its
FinalReport on the Work of the SecretariatStudy Group on Legal Aspects of CNS/ATM Systems. 6 And, in litigation now before the
U.S. courts, an Israeli-owned and controlled remote sensing corporation, ImageSat, has claimed immunity in a shareholder's
derivative action questioning business decisions. 6 2 An understanding of the background, purposes, and mechanics of government immunity can only help the space industry address
these situations proactively.
III.

GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY
A. BACKGROUND

"Sovereign immunity encompasses immunity from both suit
and liability."63 "A recognized state [enjoys] immunity from the
jurisdiction of the courts of other states."64 The doctrine can
operate as a bar to actions between sovereigns, but more often is
implicated in actions between private parties engaged in activi65
ties with governmental entities.
Two schools of thought exist on the origins of the doctrine.
One is based upon the theory that as sovereign equals, one state
cannot exercise authority over another, while the other is based
upon the common law tradition originating with the Romansrex non potest peccare-that"the king could do no wrong."6 6 Immunity can extend from the head of state to the government
and its organs, the leader of the government (if a different per61 Secretariat Study Group, Final Report on the Work of the SecretariatStudy Group
on Legal Aspects of CNS/ATM Systems app. § 3.4.1 (Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Working Paper No. C-WP/12197, 2004).
62 Wilson v. ImageSat Int'l N.V., No. Civ. 6176(DLC), 2008 WL 2851511
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2008), appeal docketed (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2008). See generallyJason
A. Crook, Corporate-SovereignSymbiosis: Wilson v. ImageSat International,Shareholders'
Actions, and the Dualistic Nature of State-Owned Corporations, 33 J. SPACE L. 411
(2007).
63 Gulf Electroquip, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-00-01149-CV, 2002
WL 480245, at *1 (Tex. App. Houston-[14th Dist.] Mar. 28, 2002, pet. denied);
see also GLF Constr. Corp. v. LAN/STV, 414 F.3d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 2005).
64 HUGH M.

KINDRED ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND

APPLIED IN CANADA 285

(7th ed. 2006).

65 See id. at 289-90.

66 Pro2, http://www.proz.com/kudoz/latin to-english/lawvpatents/101818rex-non-potes-peccare.html; M. Mofidi, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and
the "Commercial Activity" Exception: The Gulf Between Theory and Practice, 5 J. INT'L
LEGAL STuD. 95, 96-97 (1999).
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son), ministers, officials, agents of the state for their official
acts,
67
some public corporations, and state-owned property.
Absolute immunity is just that-immunity for all government
acts-"susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself."6 8
That view was fully embraced by 1926 in Berizzi Brothers v. The
Pesaro.69 It is "the product of comity concerns rather than a
7°
want of juridical power.
However, the State Department and the U.S. Supreme Court
seemingly were at odds in application of the immunity. The
State Department was concerned that adjudications against foreign sovereigns could "embarrass the executive arm of the government," leading to Supreme Court reluctance to adjudicate at
all. 7 1 By the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court recognized the commercial advantage that absolute immunity provided to foreign sovereigns over private businesses.7 2 The State
Department reconsidered its position and recognized that the
extended immunities possibly were based upon outdated con73
ceptions of sovereignty.
The Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, Jack B.
Tate, wrote a letter to the Acting Attorney General in May 1952,
stating:
According to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to
sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).
[T] he Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing
business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.
For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department's policy to
follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity.
67 KINDRED ET AL.,

supra note 64, at 290.

68 The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812).
69 271 U.S. 562, 574-76 (1926).

Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 127
S. Ct. 2352, 2358 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
72 Mofidi, supra note 66, at 99.
73 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposalfor Reform of
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 901, 906 (1969).
70

736

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control
the courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a
plea of sovereign immunity where the executive had declined to
do so. There have been indications that at least some Justices of
the Supreme Court feel that in this matter courts should follow
the branch of the Government charged with responsibility for
the conduct of foreign relations."4
The Tate Letter, as it became known, was only a partial success
in resolving the uncertainty surrounding sovereign immunity.
While it expressed succinctly the shift from absolute to restrictive immunity, distinguishing between public and private acts of
a state, it left unsettled the matter of who should determine
whether immunity attached in a given situation-the courts or
the State Department.
For more than twenty years this ambiguity remained, allowing
foreign states the alternative of seeking State Department approval for claims of immunity, creating the possibility that the
Department would give in to political pressure. The European
Convention on State Immunity, adopting restrictive state immunity, was signed by all members of the Council of Europe in
1972. 7 Eventually, the United States enacted the Foreign States
Immunity Act ("FSIA") in 1976, codifying the restrictive theory
and reflecting the policy followed by a majority of States.7 6 One
of the most significant results of the Act was that it settled the
question ofjurisdiction, placing the responsibility in the judicial
77
system rather than in the State Department.
Trendtex Trading Corp. v. CentralBank of Nigeria contains an interesting perspective on the position of the international community on the subject of state immunity in 1977, one year after
the FSIA was enacted. 7' The United Kingdom passed its State
Immunity Act in 1978; 7" Canada followed with its State Immunity Act in 1985. s° Both adopted restrictive immunity. The
United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property was adopted by the General Assembly
74 Id.
75

(citing The Tate Letter, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952)).
European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, Europ. T.S. No.

074.
76 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611
77 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000).

(2000 & Supp. 2005).

78 See generally Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., [1977] 1 Q.B. 529
(C.A.).
79 State Immunity Act, 1978 c. 33 (Eng.).
80 State Immunity Act, R.S.C., ch. S 18 (1985).
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in 2004. s1 The new instrument also reflects the restrictive theory of state immunity.
The U.S. Supreme Court officially espoused restrictive immunity for foreign states in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba;12 although the case was argued under a different theory-the act of state doctrine-discussed infra section III.B.
The Court found that the case essentially dealt with the issue of
immunity, which it denied because the conduct was commercial
in nature."'

B.

FOREIGN STATES IMMUNITY ACT

"[T] he text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress'
intention that the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in [U.S.] courts." 4 As a starting point,
then, "a foreign state is presumptively immune from suit unless
85
a specific exception applies.
[C] ourts employ a burden-shifting analysis. The defendant [foreign state] must first establish a prima facie case that it is a sovereign state, creating a rebuttable presumption of immunity. Once
the foreign sovereign makes that prima facie showing of immunity, the plaintiff has the burden of production to make an initial
showing that an FSIA exception to foreign immunity applies.8 6
The court must resolve whether foreign sovereign status applies-a question of law-as a threshold matter. The statute
contains rather elaborate definitions:
§ 1603. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter(a) A "foreign state", except as used in section 1608 of this title,
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any
entity-(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
81 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and

Their Property, Dec. 16, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 803.
82 425 U.S. 682, 705-06 (1976).
83 Id.

84 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989).
85 Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 127
S. Ct. 2352, 2355 (2007).
86 Orient Mineral Co. v. Bank of China, 506 F.3d 980, 991 (10th Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted).
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(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest
is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
defined in section 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created
under the laws of any third country. s7
Though not directly applied, in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,ss
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed as correct the application of
the five-factor framework used by federal appellate courts to determine whether an entity is an organ or instrumentality of the
state as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1604(b). The factors are:
(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national
purpose; (2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity; (3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public
employees and pays their salaries; (4) whether the entity holds
exclusive rights to some right in the [foreign] country; and (5)
how the entity is treated under foreign state law. s"
Some lower U.S. courts have used "a 'characteristics' test, asking whether, under the law of the foreign state where it was created, the entity can sue and be sued in its own name, contract in
its own name, and hold property in its own name."9 Other
courts, mainly appellate, have adopted a "core functions" test
limiting inquiry to "whether the defendant is 'an integral part of
a foreign state's political structure' or, by contrast, 'an entity
whose structure and function is predominantly commercial."'91
In Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., a private citizen, having received a judgment against Iran in an unrelated
case, sought to attach an arbitral award against a military sup28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a)-(b) (2000).
88 538 U.S. 468, 473 (2003) (affirming the Ninth Circuit holding that Dole
Foods did not meet the definition of an instrumentality of a foreign state when
the facts were applied to the five factors described herein); see Patrickson v. Dole
Food Co., 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001).
89 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Nippon Tel. & Tel. Corp., 478
F.3d 274, 279 (2007) (holding that regulation was not supervision, nor was research a government function or an exclusive obligation or right such that Japan's largest telecommunications company was immune from suit in a U.S.
patent action as an instrumentality of the state); see also Peninsula Asset Mgmt.
(Cayman) Ltd. v. Hankook Tire Co., 476 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2007); Filler v.
Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004).
90 Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of
Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 495 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2007).
87

91 Id.
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plier in favor of Iran.92 Although the Circuit Court initially held
that litigation concerning attachment of Iran's award was within
its jurisdiction as a commercial exception under the FSIA, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the Ministry was an
agency of Iran.9 3 In his second attempt to collect, Elahi, the
judgment creditor, brought an action under the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act ("TRIA") and the Victims Protection Act. 94 The
Circuit Court allowed the claim and found Iran's immunity
waived. 9 5 Whether the Ministry of Defense's asset, the award,
could be attached as an instrumentality of Iran became the ultimate issue.
The Cubic Defense court applied the "core functions" test, asking whether the defendant was an integral part of Iran's political
structure or, alternately, "an entity whose structure and function
[was] predominantly commercial."9 6 Acknowledging a "strong
presumption that the armed forces constitute a part of the foreign state itself," one that Elahi failed to rebut, the court found
the Ministry's asset to be out of reach.9 7
Elahi did not give up. He argued that the award could be
attached under section 1610(a) of the FSIA, allowing attachment of foreign-owned property in the United States that had
been used for a commercial activity.9" Elahi argued that the arbitral award arose out of the Ministry's commercial activity (sale
for military goods and services).99 The court did not agree, although it seems the court misapplied the nature test in coming
to that conclusion. Finally, the court allowed Elahi to attach
under the TRIA. 100
Instrumentality status is determined by the facts at the time
the action is filed.1" 1 In other words, if the foreign state's interest in a corporation was not a majority interest until after filing,
then the claim of instrumentality more than likely would fail.
Likewise, if a foreign state-owned entity, such as an airline, is
92

Id. at 1027-29.

93 Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of

Iran v. Elahi, 546 U.S. 450, 453 (2006).
94 Cubic Def, 495 F.3d at 1030-34.
- Id. at 1034.
96 Id. at 1034-35.
97Id. at 1035.
98Id. at 1036.
99 Id.
100 Id.

at 1037.
See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 478 (2003); Olympia
Express, Inc. v. Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 509 F.3d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 2007).
10,
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privatized after a claim arose, the claim would not lose its status
under the FSIA."' 2 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that control could not be substituted for ownership interest, and
itself be
that a subsidiary of an instrumentality could not by
10 3
removed.
far
too
was
it
as
instrumentality,
an
found
Because the FSIA grants subject matter jurisdiction over the
foreign state, objection to this jurisdiction may be raised at any
time." 4 And before a court may enter a default against a foreign state, the FSIA requires the plaintiff 1to5 establish to the
court's satisfaction his or her right to relief. 1
Once the defendant has made its case for immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that one of the seven statutory
exceptions applies, granting the court jurisdiction to hear the
case. 116 The commercial activity exception found in FSIA section 1605(a) (2) is the most significant of those enumerated." °7
For the purposes of this paper, it is necessary to quote substantive provisions of the statute, inter alia.
§ 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a
foreign state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the

waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for
such property is present in the United States in connection with
a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such
102 Leith v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 897 F. Supp. 1115, 1115-16 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
103 Dole, 538 U.S. at 477.
104 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006).
105 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2000); Cubic Def., 495 F.3d at 1028 n.1.
106 Orient Mineral Co. v. Bank of China, 506 F.3d 980, 991 (10th Cir. 2007).
107 Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992).
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property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of
the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality
is engaged in
10 8
a commercial activity in the United States.
The Act defines "commercial activity" as
(d) .

.

. either a regular course of commercial conduct or a par-

ticular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character
of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose.
(e) A "commercial activity carried on in the United States by a
foreign state" means commercial activity carried on by such state
and having substantial contact with the United States.'0 9
The courts have carved out definitions and tests to assure
proper application of sections 1603(d) and (e), and 1605(a) (2)
to the facts of a given case." 0 In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that eligibility for the commercial activity
exception requires identification of the particular conduct upon
which the claim is "based," or the "gravamen of the complaint,"
as per the statutory language."' It is not enough that commer12
cial activity have some loose connection to the basis of claim;1
the offending conduct must flow from genuine commercial
activity.
The statute expressly dictates that it is the nature of an act
that determines its commercial character, not the purpose of
that act." 3 The U.S. Supreme Court described this distinction
aptly:
[T]he question is not whether the foreign government is acting
with a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely
sovereign objectives. Rather, the issue is whether the particular
actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private party engages in "trade and traffic or commerce." Thus, a foreign
government's issuance of regulations limiting foreign currency
exchange is a sovereign activity, because such authoritative control of commerce cannot be exercised by a private party; whereas
a contract to buy army boots or even bullets is a "commercial"
10s
109

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000).
Id. §§ 1603(d)-(e).

110 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1993).
'It Id. at 357.
112

Id. at 358.

113

28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).

742

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

activity, because private companies can similarly use sales con14
tracts to acquire goods.'
The FSIA breaks the commercial activity exception into three
alternative scenarios, each providing sufficient connection to
the United States to afford a jurisdictional nexus. 1 First, the
commercial activity can be conducted in the United States by
the foreign state." 6 Next, it can be an act performed in the
United States but in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state somewhere else." 7 Third, it can be predicated
upon an act outside U.S. territory in connection with commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere if that extra-territorial
act caused a direct effect in the United States."'
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that "an effect is 'direct' if it follows 'as an immediate consequence of the defendant's . . .activity.""' 9 This holding was
expanded in American Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, a recent
Sixth Circuit case, where that court applied the principle de
minimis non curat lex to ensure that jurisdiction was not based
upon "purely trivial effects."''" The court acknowledged the difficulty in applying Weltover's "immediate consequences" test and
analyzed it in terms of the "legally significant act" test.' 2 ' The
court found that second test unnecessary and held:
[T] he mere act of including an American company in or excluding an American company from the process of bidding on a contract, where both parties' performance is to occur entirely in a
foreign locale, does not, standing alone, produce an immediate
consequence in the United States, and therefore, does not "cause
a direct effect in the United States" for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a) (2).122
World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan2 not only
sheds light on the sufficiency of waivers to abrogate immunity, it
does so in the context of a P3. In this case, the government of
114 Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1992) (citations
omitted); see also El-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 496 F.3d 658, 667 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
-5 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2).
1 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.

1"9Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
120 501 F.3d 534, 539 (6th Cir. 2007).
121

Id. at 539-40.
at 541.

122 Id.
123

296 F.3d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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Kazakhstan entered into four agreements with a Canadian company in an effort to privatize its uranium industry.' 4 One of the
agreements actually contemplated a P3 joint venture. 125 Among
the government's responsibilities per the agreements was to issue export licenses, which it did not do. 126 The deal failed and
the private company brought suit in a U.S. court, naming Kazakhstan and a U.S. company as defendants. 127 At issue were
waivers contained in two of the four agreements; the other two
contained none. 12 8 Waivers, both express12 and implied, are contemplated exceptions to state immunity.
The plaintiff attempted to rebut Kazakhstan's immunity on
the grounds of the waivers. 3° Interestingly, it did not argue the
commercial activity exception. 3 ' "In general, explicit waivers of
sovereign immunity are narrowly construed 'in favor of the sovereign' and are not enlarged 'beyond what the language requires. ' ' 111 2 Under section 1605(a) (1), express waivers must be
"clear, complete, unambiguous, and [an] unmistakable manifestation of the sovereign's intent to waive its immunity."'3 3 World
Wide Minerals asked the court to find implied waiver for the two
agreements that were silent on the issue. 1 4 The court held,
however, that the silence led to ambiguity as to the government's intent and found only express waivers for the two agreements where they were included. 135 The story does not stop
there. Although the court found that it had subject matterjurisdiction, dismantling Kazakhstan's immunity over two of the
claims, it still dismissed World Wide Mineral's action, holding
that Kazakhstan's decision not to issue the export licenses
was
136
an act of state not to be second guessed by the court.
Any discussion of adjudication over sovereign acts must in-

clude the act of state doctrine which "precludes [U.S.] courts
...from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recog124

Id. at 1157.
1157-58.

125 Id. at

Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1158-59.
1'2 Id. at 1161.
129 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2000); World Wide Minerals,296 F.3d at 1161.
13o World Wide Minerals, 296 F.3d at 1161.
126
127

13, Id.

Id. at 1162 (citing Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986)).
Id.
134 Id. at 1162-63.
132

133

135 Id.

136

Id. at 1167.
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nized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.''1 7 The act of state doctrine is important to consider when

examining the types of actions for which a public partner in a P3
can be held accountable even if a valid waiver is in place. In
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 3' the U.S. Supreme Court "was evenly divided on ...whether the 'commercial' exception ... also limited the availability of an act-of-state
defense."' 3 9 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. revisited the issue when forced to rule on whether Argentina's issuance of
commercial bonds to raise capital for its economy-and its unilateral extension of the time to pay on those bonds-was (i) an
act of a sovereign to fulfill its obligations when confronted with
a national credit crisis, (ii) an act of state, or (iii) simply a commercial decision which any issuer of debt instruments could
make. 4 ' The Court used the nature v. purpose test to conclude
that Argentina's actions were not an act of state but participation of a private actor.41
In some situations a civil servant inquiry becomes relevant,
such as when an employee brings an action against a foreign
state for its actions in relation to his or her employment. Although not all U.S. Circuit Courts are in agreement with respect
to this, in EI-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, the Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia applied a flexible test, listing five relevant considerations while acknowledging that the list was not
142
exhaustive.
First, how do the U.A.E.'s own laws define its civil service, and do
El-Hadad's job title and duties come within that definition?
Second, what was the nature of El-Hadad's employment relationship with the U.A.E.? Did he have a true contractual arrangement, or is his "contract" claim instead based ... solely upon the
civil service laws of the U.A.E.?
Third, what was the nature of El-Hadad's employment relationship when he worked in the U.A.E., and how did his subsequent
employment at the Embassy relate to that prior tenure?
Fourth, what was the nature of El-Hadad's work? ...
137 Id. at 1164-65 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
401 (1964)).
138 425 U.S. 682 (1975).
139 Republic of Arg. v.Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 613 (1992).
140

Id. at 615-16.
616-17.

141 Id. at
142

EI-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 496 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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of El-Hadad's Egyptian nationality on
Fifth, what is the relevance
14 3
case?
this
of
the facts
The El-Hadad court's reliance on the nature of the plaintiff's
employment as opposed to its purpose, even in this context, is
apparent.1 44 Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiff was not
a civil servant and his employment contract was commercial in
5
nature, and the U.A.E. was held accountable for its breach."
C.

ADDITIONAL U.S. LAw PROVIDING STATE IMMUNITY

Prior to enactment of the FSIA, Congress passed the International Organizations Immunities Act ("OA"). 146 The statute
granted international organizations "the same immunity from
suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign
governments, except to the extent that such organizations may
expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract."' 47 At the time the statute
entered into force, the immunities extended to foreign governas dements by the United States were absolute. 148 The FSIA,
14
scribed in great detail infra, restricted this immunity.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the scope of
immunity offered to intergovernmental organizations ("IGOs")
under the IOIA. However, in a 2008 appellate case, Inversora
Murten, S.A. v. Energoprojekt-Niskogradnja Co., the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia held the immunity still to be absolute.1 50 As a result, there are no exceptions for commercial activity, etc. 15 ' The only available exception is achieved through
the organization's express waiver. 15 2 International and national
law governing immunity for international organizations requires
that the language of such a waiver not be broad on its face and
be narrowly construed, and must further the organization's
objectives in entering the contract or agreement in which the
waiver is found. 5 '
Id.
144See id. at 667.
145Id. at 668.
143

146 22

U.S.C. §§ 288-288k (2000 & Supp. 2005).

14722 U.S.C. 288a(b) (2000).
148 See
149 See

infra Part III.A.
infra Part IJI.B.
150264 Fed. App'x 13, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
151 Id.
152 Id.

153 Id.
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Executive Order 9698 contains an extensive list of international organizations entitled to enjoy the absolute immunity of
the IOIA. 154 A number of space-related organizations can be
found on the list, to wit, the European Space Research Organization (succeeded by the European Space Agency), the International Telecommunication Union, the International Telecom1 55
munications Satellite Organization, and the United Nations.
Additionally, the ICAO, the United International Bureau for the
Protection of Intellectual Property, and the World Intellectual
Property Organization are listed. 1 56 An organization should
properly word express waivers of immunity in P3 agreements involving listed IGOs, taking into account that it must receive
some benefit for the immunities it releases.
Several other laws in the United States deal with bringing suit
against the federal government in a U.S. court. As lawsuits are
possible in light of the U.S. policy to employ more entities along
the public-private spectrum, the laws bear mention. First is the
Tucker Act, in which the United States waives its immunity
against suit for actions arising out of express or implied contracts with the government or one of its agencies. 57 Claims may
be for constitutional violations or "for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. ' 158 Tort claims are
excluded under this Act. 1 59 "The Tucker Act waives sovereign
immunity and allows the Court of Federal Claims to hear certain
suits against the Government."' 60 Claims for less than $10,000
fall under the Little Tucker Act; concurrentjurisdiction is available in either federal district court or the Court of Federal
Claims. 6 '
Since space business involves considerable interdependence
between the military and the private sector (falling closer to the
154 Exec. Order No. 9698, 11 Fed. Reg. 1809 (Feb. 19, 1946), amended by Exec.
Order No. 10,083, 14 Fed. Reg. 6161 (Oct. 10, 1949); Exec. Order No. 10,533, 19
Fed. Reg. 3289 (June 3, 1954).
155 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, Exi-iTir 1 (2007), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87183.pdf.
156 Id.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1) (2000).
Id.
159 See id.
160 L-3 Commc'ns Integrated Sys., L.P. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 453, 460
(2007). Interestingly, the Principal Deputy Secretary of the Air Force, whose conviction for violating conflict of interest laws led to the suit against the United
States, was responsible for the largest P3 in U.S. Air Force history, worth $10.1
billion. Id. at 457.
16, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2).
151

158
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center of the public-private continuum), litigation involving
contracts between the military and private contractors can be
instructive. In Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., a government subcontractor on a construction project sued the Army
and the Small Business Administration seeking an equitable lien
on property jointly held which had been distributed to the primary contractor who had failed to pay the subcontractor.' 6 2
The Army had not required a Miller Act bond,'63 which requires
a contractor on a federal project to post a performance bond
and a labor and material payment bond.'64 The bonds cover
first-tier claimants, or primary contractors, and their subcontractors. " 5 Claimants further down the chain, however, are "considered too remote and cannot assert a claim."' 6 6 And, as Blue
Fox, Inc. learned, with no bond, there is no possible recovery
because

sovereign

67

immunity

bars

liens

on

government

property.
Lastly, the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") permits private
parties to bring an action in federal court against the United
States for most torts committed by persons acting on behalf of
the United States.' 6" Exceptions to the FTCA include the Feres
doctrine, prohibiting suit by military personnel for injuries sustained incident to service;1 6 1 the discretionary function excep1

tion, .immunizing the United States for acts or omissions

involving policy decisions; 17 and the intentional tort exception,
unless the offending acts were committed by federal law enforcement or investigative personnel.' 7 ' Pertinent to discussion
of immunity in the context of space-related P3s is Smith v. United
States, as it dealt with a tort claim that arose in Antarctica, a region of indeterminate status in international law. 1 72 Although
the FTCA contemplates extra-territorial claims, the issue was
whether a sovereignless region constituted a foreign country for
525 U.S. 255, 256-57 (1999).
Id.
16"40 U.S.C. § 3131(b) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
165 Surety Info. Office, The Miller Act, http://www.sio.org/html/miller.html
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
166 Id.
167 Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 265.
168 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2000).
16 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
170 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
171 Id. § 2680(h).
172507 U.S. 197, 198 (1993).
162
163
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the purposes of applying the FT'CA. 173 The Court held that it
did not,' 74 leading to the conclusion by analogy that a plaintiff
injured from an event occurring in outer space caused by the
negligence of the United States would not be able to sue a government partner under the FTCA.
D.

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution removes a
class of cases from Article III jurisdiction, which established the
judiciary and the federal court system. 175 The first case heard by
the U.S. Supreme Court involving the claim of a private individual against a state was Chisholm v. Georgia,1 76 in which a citizen of
South Carolina brought an action against the state of Georgia
on a contractual debt and Georgia refused to appear. 17 7 The
Court, based on Article III, asserted jurisdiction and heard the
case.1 7 8 This decision was quickly upended one year later when
Congress passed the Eleventh Amendment, removing the possibility of suit by private179citizen against a state from the bailiwick
of the federal courts.
The text of the amendment provides, "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."' 8 " On its face, the amendment
merely withholds jurisdiction based upon citizen-state diversity;
however, the judicial reach has been extended through subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 8 ' One such case was Hans v.
Louisiana, holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity shields
states from suits brought by their own citizens.' 82 "The Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a
union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sov173

Id.

174 Id.

at 199-200.
at 204.

175 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
176 2 U.S. 419 (1793).

177 Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, andJudicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REx'. 521, 529 (2003).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 530.
180 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

181 See, e.g., Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1991).
182 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890).
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ereign immunity. It thus accords the8 3States the respect owed
them as members of the federation.'1

This shield was extended to agencies of the state in State Highway Commission v. Utah Construction Co." 4 Despite the breadth of
the amendment's reach, some state-created and/or state-managed entities are not immune. The jurisprudence that has developed analyzes a number of structural factors in order to
determine an entity's immunity or vulnerability to suit. In light
of the many and varied entities that have emerged in the trend
away from the purely public end of the spectrum, however,
courts have encountered difficulty in consistently applying these
multi-factoral tests. Also, different jurisdictions develop their
own doctrines based upon stare decisis; sister court decisions can
instruct or persuade but, of course, do not bind. However, as
these entities represent different degrees of state involvement,
and often include P3s, the cases are instructive for our purposes.
And, in the absence of binding precedent in the space realm
either in the United States or internationally, certain features of
these hybrid entities will lend themselves well to our
extrapolation.
The arm-of-the-state doctrine appears in connection with
three basic entities: (i) a political subdivision, such as a city,
county, or municipality; (ii) an entity established by two or more
states by congressionally-approved compact; and (iii) a special
purpose public corporation or agency established by or for the
state.' 85 The first is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; some forms of the other two are.' 8 6 Understanding the
purpose of the immunity assists in the analysis required to determine whether an entity of the second or third type can avoid
suit and ultimately, liability. "[I]t is not just the state's interest
in its public treasury which is at stake in the assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The state also has a 'dignity' interest as a sovereign in not being hauled into federal court."187
The importance of dignity to states was stressed in a recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision:
183 P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993) (citations omitted).
184 278 U.S. 194, 199 (1929).
185 Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2003).
186 See id.
187 Id. at 63.
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The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities. "The founding generation thought it 'neither
becoming nor convenient that the several States of the Union,
invested with that large residuum of sovereignty which had not
been delegated to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of private persons.'"'
The influence of state dignity in practical matters, such as immunity from suit and freedom from federal intervention, long
has been a source of contention in the United States.' 8 9 When
the state creates an entity without clear demarcation of its roles
and responsibilities, it becomes difficult for courts to assess the
entity's status.' 90 At the same time, since many public functions
and services are delegated to state-created entities falling closer
to the private end of the spectrum, it is doubtful that all these
entities were meant to enjoy the state's immunity from suit.
The arm-of-the-state test generally includes a combination of
five of the following eight factors: (1) whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds or could be satisfied
without direct participation or guarantees from the state; (2)
the source of the entity's funding; (3) whether the entity performs central government functions or has a proprietary function; (4) whether the entity may sue or be sued and enter into
contracts in its own name and right; (5) whether the entity has
the power to take the property in its own name or only in the
name of the state and whether that property is subject to taxation; (6) whether the state exerts control over the agency, and if
so, to what extent; (7) whether the state has immunized itself
from responsibility for the agency's acts or omissions; and (8)
the corporate status of the entity.'
These factors are considered in evaluation of the nexus between an entity and the state to discriminate between governmental entities. Of these factors, the source of the entity's
funding is considered the weightiest. 192 However, it is important
188Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (citations omitted).
189 For a marvelous treatment of the historical roots of state dignity, see Scott
Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontier of State Sovereignty, 56 OKLA. L. Rrv. 777 (2003).
190 Alex E. Rogers, Note, ClothingState Governnental Entities with Sovereign Inmunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine,92 COLUM. L. REX'.
1243, 1251-52 (1992).
191See Ali v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 355 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th
Cir. 2004); Fresenius, 322 F.3d at 62.
192 Barron v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 381 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2004).
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to recognize that these factors are not intended to impute armof-the-state status to private entities.193 This point was recently
made by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a
case where a private company claimed state immunity from a
suit arising from services it provided to the district attorney. 194
Contractors do not receive immunity.195 The fact that a private
company performs a central governmental function is not
enough alone to grant state immunity, nor can immunity be extended to private companies as arms of the state.196
While independent contractors cannot, per se, claim immunity from suit arising out of work done for the state, there are
situations when a contractor can "acquire" immunity. This exception "provides that a contractor [that] performs its work...
with a governmental agency, and under the governmental
agency's direct supervision, is not liable for damages resulting
from its performance."1' 97 A contractor would not be protected
for its negligence, only for acts done in accordance with its contract with the state.' 98 Some states call this "derivative sovereign
immunity."' 99
Also important to the arm-of-the-state analysis is recognition
of bi-state entities, creations of three sovereigns-two separate
states and the federal government. These bodies are governed
by compact agreements between the states (or between a state
and an Indian tribe), with congressional consent.2 "' Typically,
these Compact Clause entities fall outside the range of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, as that immunity is "only available to
'one of the United States.' "21
See Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1072.
195 Id. at 1078. Of note, the government contractor defense to the FTCA is a
different thing entirely. There, a contractor of the federal government can claim
immunity from torts committed if the contractor was following specifications
given by the government, similar to the acquired immunity doctrine. See Ali, 355
F.3d at 1146.
196 See Del Campo, 517 F.3d at 1078.
197 Lopez v. Mendez, 432 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2005).
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc. 502 F.3d 1331, 1343 (11th
Cir. 2007); GLF Constr. Corp. v. LAN/STV, 414 F.3d 553, 554 (5th Cir. 2005);
Butters v. Vance Int'l., Inc. 225 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 2000); Hilbert v. Aeroquip, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D. Mass. 2007); Taylor v. Comsat Corp., No.
2:05-0920, 2006 WL 3246508, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 8, 2006).
200 See Interstate Compacts as a Means of Settling Disputes Between States 35 HARv. L.
REv. 322, 322-26 (1922).
201 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 43 (1994).
111
194
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In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency,
the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a bistate entity could qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity."'
The case involved the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
("TRPA"), created by compact between California and Nevada
and approved by Congress. 2 3 The Court held that a Compact
Clause agency presumably was not qualified for Eleventh
Amendment immunity "[u] nless there is good reason to believe
that the States structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy
the special constitutional protection of the States themselves,
and that Congress concurred in that purpose. '' 2 ° 4 The Lake
Country court found that the TRPA did not meet the requirements such that immunity could inure.20 5
In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., the Supreme
Court again was confronted with the issue.20 6 Injured railroad
workers brought separate suits against PATH, a commuter rail
system connecting New York and New Jersey. 2°7 Along the procedural path, the cases were consolidated. 0
PATH moved to
20 9
dismiss, asserting, inter alia, Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Court evaluated the bi-state compact at issue and found
that neither it, nor its implementing legislation, categorized
PATH as a state agency, and that parts of its governance were
local while other parts were controlled by each state.21 0 More
telling was that the two states involved lacked any financial responsibility for PATH and bore no legal liability for its debts.2 1 '
Neither state alone could control the entity. 2 12 Faced with conflict in its analytic results, the Court stated, "[w] hen indicators of
immunity point in different directions, the Eleventh Amendment's twin reasons for being [dignity and financial solvency]
remain our prime guide. ''2 13 That said, PATH's financial self202

440 U.S. 391, 393 (1979).

203

Id.

204

212

Id. at 401.
Id. at 402.
513 U.S. 30 (1994).
Id. at 33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 47.
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sufficiency tipped the balance in favor of no immunity and
PATH was left to answer its injured workers' claims in court.2 1 4
The following analysis of cases, while not exhaustive, shows
that U.S. courts hesitate to find entities arms of the state, and
therefore beyond the reach of an action for damages.
State Arm?

Immune?

Highway construction
contractor

No

No

Hospital

No

No

Non-profit administering
student loans

No

No

Engineering consultant

No

Yes

Wyoming Community
Development Authority

No

No

Hess v. PATH 22 0

Bi-state commuter rail
system

No

No

Justus v. Kellogg Brown
22 1
& Root Services, Inc.

Engineering contractor

No

No

Rosario v. American
Corrective Counseling

Private, for profit
operator of bad check
restitution company
contracting with state
attorney

No

No

Barron v. Deloitte &
Touche, L.L.P. 223

State's Medicaid fiscal
intermediary

No

No

Takle v. Univ. of2 2Wisc.
4

Hospital

No

No

Entity

Style of Case
Lopez v. Mendez

2 15

Fresenius 2 16
Lees v. TSAC

21 7

GLF v. LAN/STV2 1 8
Durning v. Citibank

Serv.

21 9

222

Hospital Clinics

Clearly, extension of immunity requires far more than pleading it. Axiomatic, too, is the fact that parties who successfully
Id. at 52.
Lopez v. Mendez, 432 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2005).
216 Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean
Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2003).
217 In re Lees, 264 B.R. 884 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
218 GLF Constr. Corp. v. LAN/STV, 414 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2005).
219 Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1991).
220 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
221 Justus v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 373 F.Supp. 2d 608 (W.D. Va.
2005).
222 Rosario v. Amer. Corrective Counseling Servs., Inc., 506 F.3d 1039 (11th
Cir. 2007).
223 Barron v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 381 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 2004).
224 Takle v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. & Clinics Auth., 402 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2005).
214

215
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plead immunity avoid the litigation that could result in a published opinion.
Another case reveals an organizational structure resembling a
P3, in the context of a taking. The analysis of whether the organization was a part of the state is useful. In Illinois CleanEnergy
Community Foundation v. Filan, the legislatively-created foundation enjoined the state from enforcing a demand for its assets
on the grounds that it would be a taking. 225 The state countered

with the argument that the foundation was, in essence, the state,
and therefore could not complain about the state taking its own
property. 226 Additionally, the state argued that it could amend
the statute creating the foundation to allow for the transfer of
title. 227 The court quickly disposed of that argument noting that
the state lawfully cannot enlarge its regulatory power to allow
the taking of someone's property through amendment of an existing statute, but only through enactment of a new one.228
More telling was the court's holding that "[t]he fact that the
state legislature authorized the creation of the plaintiff
founda229
tion does not make the foundation a state agency.
IV. APPLYING THE TESTS TO P3S
Now it is time to apply the different doctrines that allow or
deny immunity to the hybrid entities that are evolving in the
space industry. "[E] ach [P3] is sui generis, and consequently...
no body of law or regulations ... applies to all [P3] contractual

arrangements. '' 2 " The decision of how to apply the various immunity tests to P3s becomes more difficult the closer one finds
the entity at issue to the middle of the continuum. A purely
commercial activity carried out by a foreign state can be denied
immunity. On the other hand, an independent contractor following his contract to the letter can enjoy immunity.
"[T]he most important factors to consider in deciding
whether a hybrid entity is the state for purposes of sovereign
immunity are the extent of state control and whether the entity
was acting as the state's agent in conducting the activity that
225 392 F.3d 934, 935 (7th Cir. 2004).
226 Id. at 936.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.

230 Cook, supra note 10, at 1.
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gave rise to the suit."23 ' U.S. courts are "extremely hesitant to
extend this fundamental and carefully limited immunity to private parties whose only relationship to the sovereign is by contract. ' 23 2 This is not necessarily a bad thing. The commercial
exception in restrictive foreign state immunity was adopted primarily because it leveled the playing field in a world where governments were behaving increasingly as ordinary trade partners.
At this point in history, governments actually are trade partners..
What becomes apparent when looking at both domestic and
international law is that immunity does not extend in the face of
clear, unambiguous waiver and obvious commercial activities. A
P3 in the United States, coalescing private interests with a government partner, requires use of the arm-of-the-state test. How
is the deal structured? What is the source of funding? Who will
have to pay a judgment-the entity or the government? Are the
roles clearly defined? Are the risks spread equitably and transparently? Is the service provided governmental or proprietary?
Already, telecommunications infrastructure widely has been recognized as a public service.23 Earth observation, the internet,
and military communication illustrate delivery of public services
through private means. And, with a foreign partner, the nature
v. purpose test will apply.
As noted earlier, it appears nearly impossible for a privatized
concern to avoid suit under the auspices of the state, and is only
possible for a hybrid concern if the factors, considered together,
render immunity inappropriate. In actions against states or
their entities within the United States, the inquiry is whether the
entity is an arm of the state. Internationally, the inquiry will focus on whether (i) the entity is an instrumentality or organ of
the state, (ii) the P3's activity is commercial in nature, and if so,
where it occurred; and (iii) the activity from which the action
arose was an action of state.

The locus of the commercial activity is significant. In a P3,
there is potential for a private partner with a foreign government to be at a disadvantage in a U.S. court. It is important to

make sure that there is direct effect in the United States if the
P3 will be operating extraterritorially. An indirect effect, such as
a decline in stock price if a deal does not go through, would not
231 Takle v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. & Clinics Auth., 402 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir.
2005).
232 Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008).
233 J.P. SINGH, LEAPFROGGING DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESTRUCTURING

19 (1999).

756

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

qualify. Fraudulent activity in connection with a U.S. bank account would. A claim based upon a bid, won or lost, for work to
be performed outside the United States would not.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

P3s are based upon contractual agreements. In structuring
the special purpose vehicles and joint venture agreements, care
in drafting and, possibly, standardization of contracts are tools
for keeping arrangements transparent. P3s are most successful
when they survive long enough to realize the returns. Six guiding principles have been identified for the sustainability of P3s
in infrastructure contexts that can easily be applied when creating space-related ventures. 2 4 They are 1) design the project to
deliver a balanced risk profile between the public and private
partners; 2) win the commitment of critical stakeholders and
operators; 3) develop a strong contract setting forth the rules of
the game and clearly defining roles and responsibilities; 4) drive
the bidding program allowing buy-in at all levels and stages of
the process; 5) demonstrate improved service delivery; and 6)
sustain change.235 Independent advisors have been recognized
as useful in structuring P3 transactions to ensure the proper balance between public and private interests. 236 Transparency is a

key issue.
Ultimately, the viability of P3s comes down to principles of
equity and fair dealing, fairness and natural justice, and due
process, both substantive and procedural. The restrictive theory
of immunity was adopted by sovereign states in recognition of
the practical realities of business and government in the twentieth century, and in an effort to reduce legal maneuvering to
avoid responsibility. These realities have solidified in the beginning of the twenty-first century. It is safe to conclude that the
restrictive theory of state immunity has achieved the status of
customary international law, for it is followed by a majority of
the international community.
It is important to address these realities in the early stages of a
project. P3s make public services available to more users when
done efficiently. The private sector has a better track record.
Efficient delivery to more end-users really is an issue of freedom
234 Cledan Mandri-Perrott, Six Guiding Principles to Achieve Sustainable PPP Arrangements (2005), http://www.ip3.org/pub/2005-publication_002.htm.
235
236

Id.

Jagun & Marques de Sa, supra note 9, at 3.
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of access, found both in space treaties23 7 and in customary international law; limited not only to space but also to its benefits for
all on "Spaceship Earth. '238 If both sides of the spectrum proactively acknowledge the exposures and fairly apportion the risks,
then the synergy created by P3s is an awesome resource available
to all.
Clearly, the framers of the early space treaties contemplated
space activities for both the public and private sectors.2 3 9 It is a
natural development that these activities have evolved to include
formalized cooperation-not just between states-but between
states and private entities. However, even with the lofty principles of the treaties and the notion of fairness as a cornerstone to
guide space actors, it is wise to address the reality that not all
participants will play fair. For this reason, it is recommended
that the claims arising from space-related P3s be resolved on the
basis of private law, where decisions are binding and relief and
enforcement possible. Government immunity does not have to
upset the balance between partners in a P3. All that is required
is clarity, transparency, and good planning.
237 See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
238 R. BUCKMINSTER FULLER, OPERATING MANUAL FOR SPACESHIP EARTH 115
(1968).
219 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 237, art. VI.
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